Ways of Knowing Cities

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We are familiar with expressions such as “a war on drugs” and “a war on terror,” but what about “a war on mobility”? Is anyone speaking about the realities of our world in this way? It is time to popularize a radical twist in the discourse and perception of international migration and the ways it is currently dealt with. This essay builds on the idea of a war on mobility, interrogating migration through the “war” being waged against it and through the territorial technologies exporting borders and monitoring movement into the European Union.

THE BORDER EMPIRE GOES GLOBAL
Migration control increasingly takes place beyond the borders of destination countries. Migrants’ journeys are traced using advanced technology and paramilitary deployments that target their supposed places of origin and possible routes of transit. The United States, the European Union, and Australia have increasingly displaced their respective border controls farther away from national limits, under the assumption that these countries are the destination for most migrants.

During the recent “refugee crisis,” the European Union increased its bilateral agreements with “third,” or non-EU, countries for the containment of migration flows—strengthening collaboration on border patrol, surveillance, and interception. These border cooperation projects between destination-transit-origin countries are fundamentally changing the spatial imaginaries and realities of borders and the practices used to maintain and enforce them. EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System, has begun to reinforce near-real-time data sharing on border movements through national coordination centers in EU member states and partner countries. To support these efforts, Frontex (a body that coordinates border management across and between EU countries), European national border guards, and independent think tanks, such as the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), are providing technical and training support to countries at and beyond the external frontiers of Europe.

These border policies, which involve acting beyond territorial lines and in coordination with third countries, constitute an approach to migration management called “border externalization.” Externalization has become the predominant migration control policy in the European Union, implementing border work far beyond national borderlines. As a system for managing mobility, externalization coordinates tactics and cooperations at various scales—from retraining police and border forces and exporting biometric technology for national ID cards to intervening in third countries through paramilitary operations. Externalization not only outsources border work, meaning that a country, or group of countries, requests or coerces another country to police migration, as we have seen in the European Union’s financing of Morocco to police both Moroccan emigration and African immigrants in Morocco who may (or may not) be en route to EU countries; it also establishes the ability of border and migration enforcement institutions of one country to intervene in another. Take, for instance, the joint coastal and land patrols developed between Spanish and Mauretanian or Spanish and Senegalese border institutions.

Border externalization fits with recent theoretical considerations on “moving borders,” signaling how border work is not limited to the border itself or to traditional checkpoints but rather is constantly mobile, adjusting to migrants’ ever-changing itineraries. Besides the impact on human life, critics have
denounced the legality of stretching the border in this way and externalization’s tendency to evade international law and national jurisdictions. While externalization has been expanding in recent years, its practices have a longer history. In fact, a genealogy of externalization can be traced as far back as the slave trade and slave suppression efforts, and to early attempts at imposing visa requirements prior to travel or carrier sanctions, both dating back more than a hundred years. A more contemporary outsourcing of border control has roots in the United States’ interdiction of Haitian refugees in the early 1980s.2

The conventional understanding of migration control has been that each nation-state is in charge of its own borders at territorial lines and through visa applications in national embassies abroad. However, this traditional approach is considered incomplete among EU migration-policy circles. “Efficient migration management” requires that a nation-state goes beyond the place and time of the entry point. Transnational cooperation makes it possible to track exactly where the migrant is and is ostensibly going. This system of remote control, the off-shoring and outsourcing of borders, aims at tracing and managing the entirety of the migration journey.3 Externalization thus manifests the spatial logics of a global strategy of mobility control. This is how “migratory routes management”—which was first expressed by the European Union in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility in 2005 and which aims to track and intervene in migrants’ trajectories throughout their journeys—has become a migration management concept and strategy.4

Enacting migratory routes management as a strategy, though, requires both important shifts in how and where the border is imagined and implemented and the identification of countries needed to operationalize this strategy. To this end, externalization has also entailed new spatial thinking and vocabulary (such as the “migratory route” as an object of management) as well as new cartographies that aid in visualizing the space of the border anew. The generation and deployment of data in relation to international mobility provides an impressive number of figures, statistics, and representations about human flows, many of which are visualized as maps of migratory flow and direction. In fact, migration maps are key to current migratory policies. These institutional cartographies chart entire migratory journeys (or purport to)—identifying potential points of control far beyond any given country’s territorial limits—and thus signal both border externalization’s neo-imperial pretensions and its social impact on cities within and outside the European Union.

The i-Map project, produced and managed by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, is an important example of this attempt to reimagine the externalized border. The i-Map constitutes a thick visual archive of migratory movements presumably toward Europe. Since 2006 different versions of the i-Map (some more interactive and more detailed than others) have been available online. The i-Map clusters itineraries along major routes—indicated by thickened color lines—representing the common paths thought to be taken by irregular migrants from different locations. The map visualizes itineraries by linking “hubs” and “sub-hubs,” such as cities or neighborhoods, mentioned in police interrogations with irregular migrants. Each hub has a hyperlink (not accessible to the public) with risk assessment information developed by Frontex, along with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (better known as Europol) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. These route lines are the predominant feature of the map, as opposed to national borderlines. By representing the entire route one travels, and thus visualizing the route as a transnational geopolitical concern, the i-Map constructs new forms of illegality, targeting border crossing before any border is crossed—making people illegal at the very time and place they decide to migrate.5

The European Union and its member states have instituted border policies that attempt to manage or limit migration long before a migrant arrives at or near official EU borders. One such series of operations is Operation Seahorse, coordinated by Spain in North and Western Africa and funded by the European Union. Operation Seahorse established relations with border and coast guard authorities between multiple West African and EU countries with Spain acting as the primary mediator. These relations included conducting trainings, distributing equipment, and negotiating and conducting joint border patrols.6 These were not simply one-off exchanges but rather multiyear police cooperation missions requiring new infrastructures and protocols to facilitate them. “System architecture” is one way the Spanish Civil Guard’s border unit refers to the material buildings and technological support needed to operate these new border control projects (see figure 2). Multiple communication and control points across cooperating countries are articulated by two central nodes in Madrid and the Canary Islands (each box in figure 2). Although spanning five countries, this apparatus is considered one border architecture. According to Spanish police representatives, one of the key factors determining the success of these operations is the regular joint patrols consisting of coast guard forces from different countries (Cape Verdean/Portuguese, Mauretanian/Spanish, Senegalese/
Italian, and Senegalese/Spanish) along the West African coast (see figure 3).

One can't help but wonder why such a robust transnational police and military framework—with its corresponding political and technological infrastructures—is necessary to detain wooden boats filled with low-income or unemployed fishers. Regardless of the motives, the efficacy, or the human consequences of border externalization, these emerging practices of migration control deeply reconceptualize border architectures.

Europe's Vision of Mobility?

While we were working on the lineage of the current EU migration regime, a controversial official document, by the EU Commission, proposing to divide the world into concentric circles caught our attention: the “Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy.” The geographic imaginary in this document underpins the extraterritorial operations of Operation Seahorse; and it is a geographic imaginary that is fraught, literally, with Euro(con)centric tensions.

During the Austrian presidency of the European Union in 1998, a geographical vision of managing mobility into Europe scandalized EU authorities. Perceived as an unnecessarily restrictive and discriminatory approach to migration, the official document released to the EU commission and council evoked a clear though rigid understanding of how mobility should be distributed in the world. This 1998 document classified worldwide territories and populations therein into four concentric circles. It mapped an idea of the world where everyone, in a sense, belongs and should remain in their respective circle, with few exceptions. Such a geographical imaginary centers the European Union and dictates who should move and who should not move around the world. Despite its rather Eurocentric and hierarchical approach toward human mobility, this managerial vision underpins current EU migration policy, especially its border outsourcing practices.

The policy itself was officially voted down in 1998, though some of its ideas were further pursued by the High-Level Working Group on Migration (HLWG) and individual member states of the European Union. Slowly but surely this spatial vision has become an informal organizing framework for EU policy on migration management and the basis of restrictive migratory policies. This vision and its mapping of the world have not been fully achieved on the ground: plans and projects were tried; some succeeded, some failed. This is not a representation of the EU border regime as it actually exists. Yet the designation of spaces of the world beyond the European Union and their role in migration systems and border policy have, for the most part, remained intact.

As explicitly stated in the document, the goal was to go “global” and to replace the model of “fortress Europe.” In this globalization of borders, mobilities were instead categorized and confined to four zones according to certain criteria. The 1998 document clearly designates zones of the planet where permissible or
The third zone is characterized by countries of both emigration and transit— that is, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) area (the former Soviet Union), Turkey, and North Africa. These countries would be required to “concentrate primarily on transit checks and combatting facilitator [migrant smuggler] networks.”  

The fourth (outermost) zone is made up of countries of emigration apparently deemed beyond the reach of European “political muscle” (it mentions “the Middle East,” China, and “black Africa”). These countries are encouraged to “eliminate push factors” of migration. 

The EU Commission’s “Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy” outlined a reward system for controlling, policing, and curbing migration—incentivizing a country to meet the obligations of its particular circle and assignment: “For example, the second circle must meet Schengen standards as a precondition for EU membership; for the third circle, intensified economic cooperation is linked to the fulfillment of their obligations; and the fourth circle, the extent of development aid can be assessed on that basis.” These maps make graphically explicit what many of us take for granted in our critiques: a problematic Eurocentric vision of migration.

This highly hierarchical and racialized Euro(con)centric vision of mobility contains several assumptions that, while problematic, persist: first, everybody intends to get to circle 1 (ignoring movement within and across circles—that is, South to South migration); second, nobody gets out of the European Union, and there is no movement from circle 1 to circles 2, 3, or 4 (ignoring increasing numbers of EU citizens fleeing the austerity crisis); third, circle 1 should command who moves where; and fourth, partner countries in circles 2, 3, and 4 have no other goals or approaches to the management of mobility. In this vision, a center assigns particular roles to distinct regions of the world for both producing and managing mobility. Individual governments are expected to control their own citizens—carrying out border control in certain ways and instituting specific regulations about how and where their populations can move.

Outraged by this vision of control and its Eurocentric assumptions, we have tried to share this research with broader audiences through exhibitions showcasing the numerous cartographies produced by border authorities—and migratory maps rarely available to the public—alongside our own representations of the problematic geographic imaginary embedded in EU migratory policy documents.

We decided to revisit the European Union’s geographical imaginary as a series of maps, in the hope that a compelling counter-narrative about migration might become clear: that the proclaimed “problem” of migration is not about troublemakers from poor countries in the South fleeing in a massive exodus toward the United States and the European Union, changing the face of the world. This dusty EU policy document turns taken-for-granted assumptions of migration control upside down: the problem does not rely on those who are moving. Rather, the concern is the attempt to impose a scarily plan to control human mobility worldwide.

While institutional migration maps deploy a certain professionalism and neutrality associated with expertise, they are driven by a restrictive logic of containment. Our maps, on the other hand, are the product of embodied, experiential, and activist knowledge(s) coming from those supporting and enacting a politics of freedom of movement. The examples of countercartographies show...
how controversial, problematic, and inaccurate institutional maps for migration control are. These countermaps enable alternative visions and practices of human mobility.16

**“EMPIRE” TIMES**

Border externalization appears to reproduce the colonial logic of “ordering” territories and populations, one that dates from the high imperialism of the late nineteenth century. Direct intervention on the part of the European Union in places of supposed origin and transit of migrant trajectories—through development projects, the creation of civil registry databases, international military deployments, or foreign police operations—has led to critical readings of externalization and border cooperation as a form of neocolonialism.17 Processes of externalization imply more than a rollout of imperial power, if the agency of African nation-states, with their diverse and at times divergent reasons for participating in border cooperation with the European Union, is also taken into account.18

In the i-Map, Europe-bound migrations are represented in flashy migratory routes that erase African national borders. This is reminiscent of the boundary-making power that Europeans have historically exerted on the African continent since colonial times. This geographic imaginary embraced by the European Union and its member states portrays a displaced border space, which ignores and overrides African nation-state borders.19 That imagining only makes sense in the historical context of a colonial erasure of previously existing polities and societies. Again, Africa becomes a kind of living space for Europe to design, order, and profit from.20 In fact, we can see border externalization as the next chapter in the story told by migration and citizenship scholar Seyla Benhabib. In her writings on postcolonial migration, Benhabib observes:

This legacy of empire has come back today to haunt the [rich] countries of the Northern Hemisphere through the rise of transnational migrations. Transnational migrations also produce an uncoupling between territoriality, sovereignty, and citizenship but in ways quite different than colonialism. Whereas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, European imperialism spread forms of jurisdiction into colonial territories, which were shielded from democratic consent and control, contemporary migratory movements give rise to overlapping jurisdictions which are often protected by international norms.21 The Westphalian state which extended towards the rest of the world now finds that its borders are porous in both directions and that it is not only the center which flows to the periphery but the periphery which flows towards the center.

The center again flows to the periphery in its attempts to border the same transnational migrations that emerged, at least in part, from the postcolonial condition. While migration may produce an “uncoupling between territory, sovereignty, and citizenship,” shifting border policy is also contributing to this “uncoupling” in distinct ways. National affiliations based on exclusive loyalty to a single sovereign state have been shaken by international migration flows. With border externalization processes, “whose” border is “where” is also thrown into question. Confusion emerges in cases where, for example, a Spanish Gendarmerie officer intercepts someone in Senegalese waters. If that person claims asylum, which country must process that claim? Spain or Senegal? Overlapping jurisdictions undercut accountability, international norms, and human rights legislation.

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Fig 5: The exhibition *It Is Obvious from the Map*, at REDCAT, Los Angeles, 2017. Courtesy of Sohrab Mohebbi and Thomas Keenan.

THE BORDER EMPIRE TARGETS CITIES

While many studies of externalization focus on understanding its geopolitics and the transformations it entails in relation to law, sovereignty, and human rights, the urban dimension of externalization is often overlooked. What are the implications of externalization at the urban scale? While news headlines may focus on fences, coast guard patrols, or even desert traversals, metropolitan and minor urban settlements have become a priority in the European Union’s agenda for containing migratory flows. For remote border control, cities are considered hubs that facilitate human mobility. This is explicit in the migration routes management strategy and in the i-Map, which draws the route by connecting different cities and towns where migrants are thought to have traversed. Thus the route to be managed is a string of cities understood as migratory hubs. Depending on the time and the city along a route, border practices might include the facilitation of development projects that bring stable employment opportunities to those places; increasing police raids and the number of checkpoints asking for ID; or the rise of independent transportation services among different towns for deporting people. Given that routes and migration may shift over time, partly in response to externalization measures, the “hubs” or cities affected and how they are affected will change. All these practices constitute processes for making someone’s movement undesirable and ultimately coded as “illegal.” This production of illegal mobilities is unfolding ubiquitously, regardless of place, although it is occurring with increasing frequency and intensity at the urban scale.

These bordering practices have tangible effects on the urban fabric of cities where externalization is carried out. The city, in addition to its role in facilitating mobility through transportation infrastructures and facilities, becomes simultaneously antagonistic to mobility. This antagonism becomes apparent when the city serves as a site for increased police patrols, new policing equipment, the rolling out of ID cards for residents, EU-funded propaganda and billboards dissuading irregular migration, and even new buildings to house the International Organization for Migration and other migration-related bodies (who, at times, have become significant employers in the city). The urban landscape is thus transformed through this migration industry, or what anthropologist Ruben Anderson calls the “Illegality Industry.” In some cases, such as in Rabat (Morocco) and Nouadhibou (Mauretania), these transformations have led to increasingly segregated migrant landscapes. The pursuit of people who “might” be on their way to Europe and the adoption of restrictive migration policies by host African countries cooperating with externalization efforts are contributing to rising patterns of discrimination and ghettoization in places where these dynamics of urban spatial segregation were historically less frequent. This can occur through the stripping of legal residency from intra-African migrants and increased police attention toward those same migrant communities.

BORDERWARS AND ITS FRACTAL TECHNOLOGIES

In recapitulating externalization policies and their impact on cities, we offer a theorization of the mobility of borders and its underlying imperial politics of controlling (certain) people on the move. For this, we start by reciting the evocative statement “We did not cross the border, the border crossed us,” which has become a rallying call for pro-migration activism beyond the US–Mexico context where it was originally voiced. While counterintuitive, it points to the historical and ongoing contingent itinerancy of borderlines. It also speaks about the ingrained discriminatory character of a border mindset that believes that one’s very self can be permanently marked as “border crosser” and thus “intruder,” an inappropriate and usually undesired other.

While border crossing constitutes a hot policy and scholarly concern, borders themselves are actively “crossing” over people, regardless of their geographical locations and kinship. Borders—as institutionalized practices of containing, filtering, and ordering populations—do not just take place at the territorial limits of countries. In fact, the act of arranging people into hierarchies of mobility is becoming a ubiquitous process and reality wherever one is. Thus, the message conveyed by “the border crossed us” uniquely captures the goal of current migratory policies and the ever-reaching regime of mobility control. In its pervasiveness, all of us are potential targets to be crossed by endless sets of reproducible borders. Both the imagination and the enforcement of migration control are intended to “cross”—as in traverse through—populations. This crossing by borders is conducted through the arbitrary containment, classification, and segregation of people who are both in place and on the move.

Furthermore, borders are crossing territories far beyond the borderlines they supposedly contain. On the one hand, growing public budgets are subsidizing high-tech infrastructures for the tracking and interception of human movements at and beyond the borderline (such as with contraction of fences and externalization missions). On the other hand, institutionalized practices toward the bordering of bodies are taking place at and within the borderline through the proliferation of checkpoints inside the destination countries (the cross-checking of migration status with databases for other services like banking, driving, medical care, etc., and migrant detention). All of those practices within receiving countries speak to a parallel process of “border internalization.” This double process points to a growing normalization and institutionalization of border work regardless of location, which, in turn, leads to concerning levels of racialized profiling, random incarceration, abuse during interrogation, and deportation. The question of mobility is further complicated when we consider populations and groups of migrants who have managed to enter into the European Union. As Martina Tazzioli and Claudia Aradu have argued, it is the settlement of refugees in EU cities that becomes the target of prohibition, meaning that mobility, in turn, becomes a weapon of displacement and precarity used to keep migrants constantly on the move.

We propose to embrace this twist in our understanding of borders: from stable lines to be crossed to institutional practices actively “b/ordering” populations in an endless war on mobility. That is, borders as actively and consistently crossing us to the point that they dictate political allegiances, our corresponding entitlements, or lack thereof. Seen in this way, the powerful yet normalized device of mandatory membership and social stratification—
Borders are on the move. This itinerant character might look similar to a Situationist “drift” at first glance, but it is not the itinerancy envisioned by the open-ended method of the drift. In stark contrast, these borders in motion follow orders from a center, ruled by experts and followed by military agencies. A political will lies behind border drifting: the desire to control human mobility.

The politics driving current migration management is encapsulated in a text message sent by a sub-Saharan migrant who tried to swim the fifteen kilometers between the African and the European continents through the Strait of Gibraltar: “There is an ongoing war on migrants.”28 A few decades ago, a regular 1D would have been enough to enjoy a safe trip by ferry from Africa to southern Spain, but now he and many others are prohibited from ferry travel and must embark on the more treacherous South-to-North route. This war on mobility is spatially and culturally infecting the globe. Given the displacement of migratory control practices from national lines to points along the migratory journeys, following and incriminating migrants from beginning to end, the war against mobility has become global: urban and not urban; in centers and peripheries, mobilizing both space and time. In this scenario of borders “drifting,” where are the members of the “resistance” to such a border empire? We want to believe that resistance is also everywhere. Indeed, those moving regardless of administrative paperwork, zigzagging in unexpected motions, embody the ongoing challenge to the ubiquitous presence of the border regime. Still—and this question is yet to be explored—how does one position oneself outside and against this war on mobility?
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1 This section is based on our multiresearch project on “Border Externalization by the EU,” funded by the National Science Foundation 2010–2014. We also drew on previous research on the exhibition “Is It Obvious from the Map,” curated by Thomas Keenan and Sohrob Mohbeeb in Los Angeles and Zagreb.

2 For more on this, see “New Keywords: Migration and Borders,” which is a collaborative publication produced by more than a dozen migration and border studies scholars that consists of key concepts in current research and that establishes the parameters of a common language in critical migration and border studies. Maribel Casas-Cortés et al., “New Keywords: Migration and Borders,” Cultural Studies 29, no. 1 (2014): 55–87.


5 This is a static visualization of the migration routes published by the ICMP in 2014. The most recent version of the i-Map is accessible only with a username and password. You can request access at https://euro.ccp.eu/knowledge/policy/online-resource/interactive-map-migration-i-map.en.


7 Figures 2 and 3 are from PowerPoints used by the Spanish Civil Guard. These presentations demonstrate the rationale of externalization as well as how the border is imagined spatially in this type of border operation.


10 The HUWG was set up at the end of 1998 as part of an initiative of the Netherlands, which was president of the EU at the time. The HUWG is a strategic analysis group with representatives from various member states tasked with drafting “action plans” on migration and border policy vis-à-vis non-EU countries. It was under the auspices of this group that the strategy paper continued to have influence in official circles.


16 Many of these maps are now part of the itinerant art collection first launched in Los Angeles and later hosted in Zagreb. It Is Obvious from the Map! Maribel Casas-Cortés, Sebastian Cobarrubias, and John Pickles, “Obvious from the Map! Disobeying the Production of Inequality beyond Borderlines,” Movements: Journal für kritische Migrations und Grenzregimeforschung 4, no. 1 (January 2019): 29–44.


19 This erasure of African national borders is far from the call to “scrap the borders” that Achille Mbembe makes in a recent impassioned plea: “The next phase of Africa’s decolonisation is about granting mobility to all her people and reshaping the terms of membership in a political and cultural ensemble that is not confined to the nation-state.” Freedom of movement within Africa becomes “a cornerstone of a new pan-African agenda”. “To become a vast area of free movement is arguably the biggest challenge Africa faces in the 21st century: The future of Africa does not depend on restrictive immigration policies and the militarisation of borders.” Achille Mbembe, “Scrap the Borders that Divide Africans,” Mail & Guardian, March 17, 2017, https://mg.co.za/article/2017-03-17-00-scrap-the-borders-that-divide-africans.


21 The origin of this slogan comes from people in the US Southwest, often of Mexican descent—both migrant and non—expressing the fact that much of the Western United States was once part of Mexico. In fact, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California were seized by the United States in the Mexican–American War of 1846–1848. Pointing to the irony of labeling Mexican citizens in the US Southwest as foreigners and illegal trespassers, the expression has been contributed by everyone from writer José Antonio Burciaga to actress Eva Longoria to the band Aztlan Underground. It is widely popular because it communicates the notion that geopolitical borders are imposed on peoples that have lived in those places prior to those dividing lines.

22 Besides being used for immigrant rights, the slogan has resonated among indigenous movements, Palestinian solidarity groups, and anticolonial and racial justice struggles, all working against institutional racism and practices of exclusion.


24 “/B/ording” as developed by critical migration scholars of the Nijmegen School, relates well to this notion of borders themselves as active agents of self-replication. This piece embraces this understanding of borders as complex filters that classify populations under an apartheid logic through the triple function of bordering, ordering, and othering. See Henk van Houtum, Olivier Thomas Kramsch, and Wolfgang Zachofer, B/Ordering Space (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008), Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering and Othering,” Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie 93, vol. 2 (December 2002): 125–136.

